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Tax revenue plays an integral role in the fiscal space to ensure the provision of public goods and 
services. Indeed, it is a major source of public revenue for most countries including South Africa. 
Tax revenues also finance redistribution initiatives. Hence, an efficient tax system is a precursor 
for inclusive and sustainable growth. While taxes are crucial to mobilise public revenue, they 
generally place a burden on taxpayers. The behavioural response of taxpayers reflects in attempts 
to evade and avoid taxes, which lead to significant losses of revenue. For example, the US lost 
$450 billion worth of tax revenue in 2006 (Gemmell & Hasseldine 2012:4); the UK, £34 billion 
($41.5 billion) in 2014 (Whicker & White 2015:4), while Pakistan lost Rs397.4 billion ($4.2 billion) 
in 2005 (Ahmed & Rider 2013:336). Even though efforts to improve tax compliance are mounting, 
the extent of taxpayers’ non-compliance (or the tax gap) and the nature thereof remain fairly 
unknown in many (developing) countries. For South Africa, it is only the value added tax (VAT) 
gap that has so far been established (see Ueda & Thackray 2015). Less attention has been given to 
the tax gap in respect of personal income tax1.
There are basically two broad categories of the tax gap, the compliance gap and the policy gap. The 
compliance gap refers to the amount forgone by the authorities due to compliance-related issues 
(Ahmed & Rider 2013:335). In contrast, the policy gap captures the amount of revenue forgone by 
the government due to the impact of the policy (Toro et al. 2013:11). The International Monetary 
Fund (2015:3) refers to the policy gap as the difference between theoretical revenue, given a 
hypothetical policy framework and potential revenue, given the current policy framework. 
Knowledge about the extent and scope of the tax gap is a useful first step towards controlling non-
compliance and preventing its occurrence (European Commission 2016:13). For instance, it may 
serve as a tool to measure the effectiveness of a tax policy. It may also serve as a measure of 
1.The Davis Committee (a tax review committee appointed by the government), in its 2014 interim report, pointed out that the definite 
size of the tax gap is unknown to SARS (DTC 2014: 25).
Background: Tax evasion is one of the factors impeding tax revenue mobilisation. Although 
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liability and the actual tax revenue collected).
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Methods: This study employs a micro-simulation approach using data from the Income and 
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and R26.2 bn in 2010/2011 (in 2017 prices). Of the total compliance gap in 2005, 28.5% emanated 
from taxpayers with salaried income, and 71.5% from non-salaried income taxpayers. In 2010, 
salaried income taxpayers contributed 1.1% to the total compliance gap.
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administrative efficiency, as a higher tax gap may indicate poor 
administrative performance. Tax gap estimates can provide 
information on the sources of the tax losses, which may assist 
in enforcing compliance more effectively. Considering fiscal 
constraints in South Africa, knowledge on the extent and 
nature of the tax gap will aid authorities to raise additional 
revenue. It is against this backdrop that this study estimates 
South Africa’s personal income tax (PIT) gap (compliance gap 
and policy gap), with a particular focus on the sources of the 
tax gap (i.e. its composition by type of income).
The remainder of the article is organised as follows: the next 
section gives an overview of South Africa’s PIT system. 
Section ‘Defining the tax gap’ defines the tax gap and section 
‘Tax gap methodologies’ explains various approaches to 
estimate the tax gap. Section ‘Calculating South Africa’s 
personal income tax gap’ reviews some empirical application 
of these approaches. The PIT gap is then calculated, and the 
results discussed in section ‘Findings and discussion’. Section 
‘Conclusions’ concludes this article.
Personal income tax in the 
South African tax system
Tax revenues finance approximately 87% of South Africa’s 
national budget, the bulk of which comprises PIT, which 
contributes over 30% of the total tax revenue (see Figure 1). 
PIT is applied using a progressive structure, with the highest 
marginal tax rate for the 2018 fiscal year set at 45% (National 
Treasury 2019:193). Most individuals receive their income 
in the form of wages or salaries, annuity payments or 
pensions, and investment income (National Treasury [NT] & 
South African Revenue Service [SARS] 2018:31). Hence, PIT 
paid stems from salaried or non-salaried income. Employees’ 
income tax liabilities are calculated on employees’ salaried 
income and are withheld by the employer (PAYE). Thus, 
settlement of income tax liabilities on remuneration income 
is done through third-party reporting. This mechanism is 
credited for minimising non-compliance since employers 
have little incentive to under-report employees’ taxes (Paulus 
2015:9). PAYE contributes over 90% of the total PIT revenue.
Unlike salaried income, non-salaried income earners pay taxes 
through the method of provisional tax payment. This method 
allows the taxpayer to pay income tax across the relevant 
assessment year, as two advance payments are expected, with 
a possible third payment at the end of the tax year, if required 
(South African Revenue Service [SARS] 2018). Non-salaried 
income earners are suspected to be the main source of non-
compliance within the South African PIT system (see Marcus 
2007:156). In South Africa provisional taxes constitute on 
average 7% of the total PIT collections. Figure 2 shows the 
trend of PAYE and provisional tax payments for the period 
2007/2008 to 2016/2017.
Defining the tax gap
Taxpayers tend to adopt measures that reduce their tax 
liabilities. For instance, taxpayers take advantage of legal 
loopholes within the tax system to reduce their tax liabilities, 
a phenomenon called tax avoidance. On the other hand, 
taxpayers may, in contravention of the law, intentionally 
under-report their taxable income – an act referred to as tax 
evasion. Tax evasion includes under-reporting taxable 
income, overstating deductions, and late and non-filing 
of tax returns (Gcabo & Robinson 2007:358). In some 
instances, governments may introduce tax expenditures 
(e.g. exemptions, special credits, rebates and preferential tax 
rates) to reduce taxpayers’ liabilities, to better align the 
income tax with the ability to pay principle. All these 
measures reduce the tax liabilities, which reduce the revenue 
yield below its potential which creates a tax gap (Alm & 
Martinez 2003:1). As outlined previously, the tax gap is the 
difference between the potential tax revenue and the actual 
collections, where potential revenue is the amount of tax 
that the government should collect if every taxpayer 
complies with the tax legislation (Toro et al. 2013:14). It is 
classified into the compliance gap and the policy gap: the 
former denotes the value of revenue losses due to the impact 
of compliance-related issues (such as deliberate evasion, tax 
losses due to taxpayers’ misunderstanding of tax legislation, 
tax authorities’ poor record-keeping and other errors; 
Ahmed & Rider 2013:335). The policy gap reflects the 
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Source: National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2018, 2018 Tax 
statistics, p. 9, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria






















































PAYE, pay as you earn.
Source: National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2017, 2017 Tax 
statistics, p. 21, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria
FIGURE 2: PAYE and provisional tax payments, 2007/2008–2016/2017.
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impact of the policy (Toro et al. 2013:11), and includes tax 
forgone due to tax avoidance and tax expenditures. Put 
succinctly, the policy gap is just a normalised measure of tax 
expenditures (Keen 2013:436).
Tax gap methodologies
There are broadly two approaches to measure the tax gap, 
namely the top-down and the bottom-up approaches. The 
top-down (or macro-) approach relies on macro-economic 
data and the theoretical (or potential) tax liability is calculated 
from a single estimate of the tax base (Rubin 2011:109). Toro 
et al. (2013:33) indicate that to estimate reliable tax estimates 
using this approach, data must be representative enough of 
the tax base, and it must be derived from sources other than 
taxpayers’ records. The advantage of such data is the 
independence from intentional misreporting by taxpayers. 
Other benefits of this approach include its simplicity, and the 
timeous release (or production) of national data, which 
allows for the release of timely estimates.
Despite these strengths, the top-down approach has two 
fundamental shortcomings. Firstly, it provides a single 
broad estimate of the tax gap, thereby providing little 
insight into the nature and causes of the tax gap. More 
precisely, the top-down approach is not capable of estimating 
the tax gap by its components. Such an estimate does not 
adequately capacitate the government to assess its 
performance in the collection of revenue and provides little 
guidance on how to reduce the tax gap. In fact, tax gap 
estimates from the macro-approach provide little insight 
into how to improve compliance.
To circumvent the shortcomings of the top-down approach, 
many researchers prefer the bottom-up approach (micro-
approach), which uses individual-level (i.e. (micro-) data to 
determine the tax gap. This approach ‘does not depend on 
the value of a single estimate of the tax base’ (Rubin 
2011:111), neither does it rely on macro-economic data 
(Fuest & Riedel 2009:20), but uses data obtained from tax 
audit records and surveys. The main advantage of this 
technique is that it establishes the tax gap by its components 
(i.e. by type of income, sector of the economy and in some 
instances, by the causes of the gap) (see Ahmed & Rider 
2013:340–343).
Calculating South Africa’s personal 
income tax gap
A bottom-up approach is employed to estimate South Africa’s 
personal income tax gap. For a reliable estimate of the potential 
tax liability, an objective measure of the tax base is required 
(Ahmed & Rider 2013:339–340). It is in this regard that survey 
micro-data, that is nationally representative, are most ideal for 
estimating the personal income tax gap. However, such data 
are susceptible to under-reporting, especially with regard 
to high income earners. This is generally because people 
(particularly high income earners), prefer their income worth 
to be a secret (see Ahmed & Rider 2013:343).
Data and methodology
Following the methodology of Ahmed and Rider (2013), this 
study uses the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) 
data of the 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 surveys to estimate 
South Africa’s personal income tax gap. Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA) conducts the IESs every 5 years and its primary 
task is to capture household consumption data to update the 
consumer price index (StatsSA 2012:1). The 2005/2006 and 
2010/2011 data sets include samples of 21 144 and 25 328 
households respectively, collected nationwide (Stats SA 2008, 
2012). The study is limited to these two data sets as they used 
the same data collection methods (i.e. the diary and recall 
methods), and both surveys used the same classification 
of expenditure items: the Classification of Individual 
Consumption by Purpose (COICOP).
A static micro-simulation model is applied to estimate the 
PIT gap. This methodology allows us to incorporate the 
progressive nature of the tax rate structure, a critical aspect in 
estimating individual tax liabilities. The income tax liability 
is determined from the taxable income that includes 
remuneration income, business income, fringe benefits, 
taxable capital gains, interest and rental income (Black, Calitz 
& Steenekamp 2015; SARS 2016a). More specifically, to 
determine the tax liability, exclusions (e.g. in-kind income, 
unrealised capital gains and imputed rent) are removed from 
the total comprehensive income to arrive at gross income. 
Exemptions such as the tax-free portion of income (i.e. amount 
below taxable threshold), the tax-free portion of interest, and 
some pension income (e.g. war veteran’s pensions and 
disability pensions) are deducted from the gross income, 
after which allowable tax deductions (such as pension 
contributions, medical contributions, depreciation allowances 
and donations to an approved public benefit organisation) 
are subtracted from the income balance, to produce the 
taxable income (Black et al. 2015:256).
The tax due is determined by applying the tax rate schedule 
to the taxable income. The tax threshold (i.e. the taxable 
income at which a taxpayer starts to pay taxes) will generate 
a tax liability equivalent to the rebate (SARS 2016a:9). Table 1 
summarises how the tax liability is calculated.
A micro-simulation model is constructed in STATA (software), 
in line with the tax calculation illustrated in Table 1. Using a 
tax calculator2, a line by line estimation of the tax liabilities is 
performed on all positive taxable income. The estimated tax 
amounts are then grossed up to national levels using 
household weights, where the weight is an inverse of the 
household’s probability of selection. Grossed up tax liabilities 
are added together to produce the total amount of tax revenue 
that the state should collect if every taxpayer complies with 
the tax legislation.
2.The tax calculator is the model designed to calculate (simulate) the tax liabilities.
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In this study, the calculation of the PIT gap is carried out in 
three phases. First, the tax calculator is applied to gross 
income (income inclusive of tax expenditures, which is a 
hypothetical policy framework). This gives the amount of 
tax revenue the state would collect in the absence of tax 
expenditures such as rebates or deductions for medical 
expenses. Second, the potential tax liability is calculated 
from the total taxable income. The discrepancy between 
these two theoretical tax liabilities (i.e. from the gross income 
and the total taxable income) gives an estimate of the policy 
gap. The theoretical tax liability derived from the total 
taxable income is then compared to the personal income tax 
collections (obtained from SARS). The difference between 
the estimated potential tax liability from taxable income 
and the actual collections represents the compliance gap. 
Third, the tax calculator is applied to salaried income to 
estimate the theoretical tax liability for this income source. 
The estimated potential tax liability is matched against the 
actual PAYE collections and the difference gives the salaried 
income tax gap (Ahmed & Rider 2013:340). The theoretical 
tax liability for non-salaried income is calculated by 
subtracting the salaried tax liability from the total theoretical 
tax liability. The estimated potential tax liability for the non-
salaried income is then compared with the actual tax 
collections from provisional taxpayers, and the discrepancy 
between these two figures is the tax gap in respect of non-
salaried income earners. However, it is important to note 
that the actual collections may not be what is expected for a 
particular tax period, given that the current year’s collections 
would exclude late payments for the (current) year while 
including late payments for previous years. Furthermore, as 
outlined previously, this study uses gross household income, 
and this could lead to variations in the tax gap estimates (as 
the tax unit is the individual and not the household). Other 
causes of variations include the fact that the IES data is not 
equivalent to the tax year – hence income estimations in the 
survey data are not equivalent to what one would expect in 
the tax year associated with the particular survey data set. 
Given the data constraints, the tax gap estimates from this 
study remain an approximation of the gap and should be 
treated as such.
For both tax years (2005/2006 and 2010/2011), the major 
exemptions and deductions included war veterans’ and 
disability pensions, medical expenses and medical aid 
contributions, donations to public benefit organisations, 
pension fund contributions, retirement annuity fund 
contributions, legal fees, doubtful debts and wear and tear 
(SARS 2010:220–221). However, war veterans’ and disability 
pensions, donations to public benefit organisations, legal 
fees, doubtful debts and wear and tear were not used in the 
study’s calculations as they were not captured in the survey 
data sets. Deductions in respect of pensions and retirement 
contributions were limited to 7.5% and 15% of the taxable 
income. However, in both survey data sets, pensions and 
retirement annuity fund contributions were combined with 
provident fund contributions, which are not deductible. To 
separate provident fund contributions, the study assumed 
that one-third of the combined funds constitutes contributions 
to the provident fund. The tax calculators for the micro-
simulation models were constructed, based on the guidelines 
for the 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 tax years, in accordance 
with the Income Tax Return for Individuals (the ITR12).
Personal income tax brackets for the 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 
tax years are shown in Table 2.
In calculating the taxable income, it is worth mentioning that 
both the 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 data sets do not reveal 
how medical expenses were settled. Thus, it is not explicit 
whether the payment was done by the employer, household 
member or by a medical aid. The data do, however, reveal 
that approximately 25% of household income was spent on 
medical aid contributions. The analysis therefore assumed 
that 75% of medical expenses were paid by medical aid 
insurers. Deductions for medical expenses and medical aid 
contributions’ deductions were each limited to R500 and 
R625 per month in 2005/2006 and 2010/2011. In the event 
that the medical aid contributions made by the employer 
exceeded these thresholds, the excess amount was taxed as a 
fringe benefit. This excess amount is presumed to be a 
medical expense paid by the employer and, as such, it is 
deducted from the medical aid contributions made by the 
employee (SARS 2010:221). However, as outlined previously, 
this study used household survey data (to proxy individual 
TABLE 2: 2005/2006 and 2010/2011 personal income tax brackets.




0–80 000 0 – 132 000 18
80 001–130 000 132 001–210 000 25
130 001–180 000 210 001–290 000 30
180 001–230 000 290 001–410 000 35
230 001–300 000 410 001 –525 000 38
300 001 and above 525 001 and above 40
Rebates
Primary 6300 9756 -
Secondary 4500 5400 -
Tax thresholds
Below age 65 35 000 54 200 -
Age 65 and above 60 000 84 200 -
PIT, personal income tax.
Source: SARS, 2006, Guide on income tax and the individual (2005/06), viewed 10 September 
2016, from https://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/Pages/default.aspx; and National Treasury 
(NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2011, 2011 Tax statistics, National Treasury 
and SARS, Pretoria
TABLE 1: Calculation of personal income tax liability.
Variable Value
Total (comprehensive) income XXXX
Less: Exclusions XXXX








Source: SARS, 2010, Notes on South African Income Tax 2010, South African Revenue 
Authority, Pretoria
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data), as the data sets do not specify the main member of the 
fund. Medical deductions were therefore calculated from the 
household medical contributions, which may overestimate 
the expenditures.
Below follows a summary of the steps in the micro-simulation 
model to calculate the potential tax liability. First, it calculates 
the taxable income (taxY) for every household (i), defined as 












i  [Eqn 1]
Second, the tax liability (Xi) is calculated by applying the tax 
rates and rebates to taxable income for the year of assessment:
( )= :   X f taxY Tax structurei i  [Eqn 2]
Third, the tax liabilities are grossed up to national levels 
using household weights (ωi). The grossed up tax liabilities 
are added together to produce the theoretical tax liability:
  
1∑ ω=Theoretical tax liability Xi i
N
 [Eqn 3]
To establish the compliance gap, actual collections (Z0) are 
subtracted from the theoretical tax liability:
 0
1∑ ω= −Compliance gap X Zi i
N
 [Eqn 4]
To establish the amount of tax the government would collect 
in the absence of tax expenditures, the tax liability for each 
household is calculated by applying the tax rates to the gross 
income for the year of assessment:
( )= :   G f Y Tax structurei i  [Eqn 5]
The tax liabilities are grossed up to national levels using 
household weights (ωi), and added together to produce the 
gross theoretical tax liability:
∑ ω= Gi i1Gross theoretical tax liability
N
 [Eqn 6]
The discrepancy between the theoretical tax liability (from 
taxable income) and gross theoretical tax liability provides 
the policy gap:




In the absence of tax expenditures, the government could 
collect potential tax revenue of R382.3 billion from individual 
taxpayers in 2005/2006, and R449.6 billion in 2010/2011. The 
granting of tax expenditures reduced it to R276.4 billion and 
R316.6 billion. This implied that the policy gaps (the amount 
of revenue forgone due to the impact of policy) for the 
2005/2006 and 2010/2011 tax years were R105.9 billion and 
R133 billion. In both years, approximately 30% of PIT revenue 
remained uncollected due to tax expenditures. Relative to the 
total PIT gap, it is estimated that the policy gap constituted 
about 64% in 2005/2006, an estimate that increased to 84% in 
2010/2011. These are definitely very large policy gaps, 
implying that the government has been losing significant 
amounts of revenue in its effort to reduce taxpayers’ burdens.
The authority had the potential of collecting R276.4 billion 
worth of PIT revenue in 2005/2006. However, only R216.3 
billion was collected, producing a compliance gap of R60.1 
billion. This implied a compliance rate of 78.3%. The tax 
revenue forgone (due to non-compliance) is equivalent to 
21.7% of the potential tax revenue. In 2011, the government 
lost R26.2 billion worth of revenue, which is 8.3% of the 
potential tax revenue. Although this is a commendable 
improvement from the 2005/2006 tax year, the extent of 
evasion is still significant.
In 2005/2006, of the R276.4 billion potential PIT revenue, 
R218.2 billion should have been raised from employed 
individuals’ taxes (i.e. PAYE). However, PAYE collections 
amounted to R201 billion, implying a PAYE tax gap of R25.6 
billion and a compliance rate of 92.1%. In 2010/2011, instead 
of raising R265.1 billion worth of PAYE, the government 
managed to collect R264.8 billion and lost R0.3 billion through 
non-compliance (a 99.9% compliance rate).
The potential tax liability (from taxable income) for 
provisional taxpayers was found to be R58.2 billion for the 
2005/2006 tax year. However, the actual payments totalled 
R15.3 billion, thus creating a compliance gap of R42.9 billion 
and a compliance rate of 26.3%. In 2010/2011, instead of 
collecting R51.5 billion from this same group of taxpayers, 
only R25.6 billion was collected, thus implying a tax gap of 
R25.9 billion and a compliance rate of 49.7%. Although this is 
an improvement compared to the 2005/2006 tax year, it is 
worth noting that over 50% of the non-salaried potential tax 
revenue remained uncollected in 2010/2011. The tax gap 
results are depicted in Table 3.
In terms of the composition of the total PIT compliance gap, 
the gap by salaried income contributed 28.5% in 2005/2006, 
an estimate that declined to 1.1% in 2010/2011. In 2010/2011, 
and despite a significant improvement in their compliance 
rate (from 26.3% to 49.7%), the share of the gap emanating 
from non-salaried income (as a percentage of share of the 
total tax gap) increased from 71.5% to 98.9%.
The significant improvement in the compliance of salaried 
individual taxpayers could be ascribed to reforms the tax 
authorities introduced in the tax system, in particular 
modernisation initiatives (see SARS 2016b). For instance, 
SARS introduced an electronic queue management system, 
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the Branch Queue Management System (BQMS) – a system 
that is meant to improve the administration of queues at 
branch offices during tax seasons. The BQMS uses ‘mobile 
smart devices to issue tickets to the queuing taxpayers’ 
(SARS 2016b:406). The system reduced the average queuing 
times by 57% in 2010 (Rasool 2011:34). Furthermore, the tax 
authority introduced an e-filing facility, which has made the 
submission and processing of tax returns more efficient. 
These reforms made it relatively less costly to comply, which 
motivated taxpayers to oblige with the requirements of the 
tax legislation. The cost of collecting tax revenue decreased 
from 1.5% of total revenue in 2005/2006 to 1.1% in 2010/2011 
(National Treasury and SARS 2011).
A further initiative that can explain the significant increase in 
compliance rates of salaried taxpayers is the government’s 
rollout of an Individual Taxpayer Policy Registration 
programme in 2010, which required all formal employees to 
be registered as taxpayers regardless of their tax liabilities. 
The programme led to an increase in the number of individual 
registrants to 10.3 million in 2010, up from 5.9 million in 2009. 
This compulsory registration of employees could be one of 
the main explanatory factors of the significant increase in 
salaried taxpayers’ compliance rates.
Non-salaried taxpayers’ compliance can also be attributed to 
SARS’s educational campaigns, strengthened deterrent 
measures and the 2010 reprieve (the Voluntary Disclosure 
Programme). The higher non-compliance rate of non-salaried 
income earners in both years (2005 and 2010) supports the 
hypothesis that self-reporting of non-salaried income is more 
prone to non-compliance than salaried income (submitted 
through third-party reporting). Paulus (2015:9) highlights 
that because there are fewer incentives for employers to 
misreport employees’ income, employees would have to 
collude with the employers to evade taxes. Depending on the 
availability of such opportunities, it is more difficult to evade 
salaried income tax than non-salaried income tax (Paulus 
2015:24). Ahmed and Rider (2013:343) also argue that a 
withholding tax regime is an effective revenue mobilisation 
technique.
Conclusion
This study provides some fundamental insights into the 
performance of South Africa’s PIT system. The granting of 
tax expenditures reduced revenue from R382.3 billion to 
R276.4 billion in 2015/2006 and from R449.6 billion to 
R316.6 billion in 2010/2011, creating policy gaps of 
R105.9 billion and R133 billion. This is approximately 30% 
of PIT revenue for both years and 64% and 84% of the total 
PIT gap for 2005/2006 and 2010/2011. These are definitely 
very large policy gaps, implying that the government 
has been losing significant amounts of revenue in its effort 
to reduce taxpayers’ burdens. Although tax expenditures 
play an important role in reducing tax burdens, there 
is a need to examine the possibility of reducing the 
policy gap as its reduction may raise a significant amount 
of revenue.
The authority had the potential of collecting R276.4 billion 
worth of PIT revenue in 2005/06 and 316.6% in 2010/2011, 
if everyone complied with the legislation. However, 
R216.3 billion was collected in 2005/06 and R290.4 billion 
was collected in 2010/2011, producing compliance gaps 
of R60.1 billion and R26.2 billion – implying compliance rates 
of 78.3% and 91.7% in that order. In terms of the composition 
TABLE 3: Summary of tax gap estimates.
Tax year Nominal values Real values (2017 = 100)
2005/2006 2010/2011 2005/2006 2010/2011
Potential tax liability from gross income R189.6 bn R302.0 bn R382.3 bn R449.6 bn
Potential tax liability from taxable income R137.1 bn R212.7 bn R276.4 bn R316.6 bn
Policy gap R52.5 bn R89.3 bn R105.9 bn R133.0 bn
Policy gap to gross income potential liability (%) 27.7 29.6 27.7 29.6
Actual PIT collections R107.3 bn R195.1 bn R216.3 bn R290.4 bn
Total PIT compliance gap R29.8 bn R17.6 bn R60.1 bn R26.2 bn
Total gap (i.e. Policy gap and compliance gap combined) R82.3 bn R106.9 bn R166 bn R159.2 bn
PIT compliance gap to total gap ratio (%) 36.2 16.5 36.2 16.5
PIT compliance gap to potential tax liability (taxable income) (%) 21.7 8.3 21.7 8.3
Compliance rate (%) 78.3 91.7 78.3 91.7
PIT compliance gap to total collections ratio (%) 27.8 9.0 27.8 9.0
Potential tax liability (salaried income or PAYE) R108.2 bn R178.1 bn R218.2 bn R265.1 bn
Actual PAYE collections R99.7 bn R177.9 bn R201.0 bn R264.8 bn
PAYE tax gap R8.5 bn R0.2 bn R17.2 bn R0.3 bn
Salaried taxpayers’ compliance rate (%) 92.1 99.9 92.1 99.9
PAYE tax gap to total PIT compliance gap ratio (%) 28.5 1.1 28.5 1.1
Potential tax liability (non-salaried) R28.9 bn R34.6 bn R58.2 bn R51.5 bn
Actual collections (non-salaried) R7.6 bn R17.2 bn R15.3 bn R25.6 bn
Non-salaried income tax gap R21.3 bn R17.4 bn R42.9 bn R25.9 bn
Non-salaried taxpayers’ compliance rate (%) 26.3 49.7 26.3 49.7
Non-salaried tax gap to total PIT gap ratio (%) 71.5 98.9 71.5 98.9
bn, billion; PIT, personal income tax; PAYE, pay as you earn.
Note: Variables of interest are indicated in bold.
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of the PIT compliance gap, the gap by salaried income 
constituted 28.5% in 2005/06, an estimate that decreased to 
1.1% in 2010/2011, while the balance constituted the gap by 
non-salaried income. Thus, non-salaried income constituted 
the bulk of South Africa’s PIT compliance gap.
Overall, South Africa has a well-functioning PIT system 
(with a compliance rate of 91.7%). However, its compliance 
rate is lower than that observed in developed countries, such 
as the UK and Sweden where PIT compliance rates are 
around 95% (see Bäckman 2014; Whicker & White 2015). 
Apart from having a high PIT compliance rate, South Africa’s 
VAT gap for the period 2007–2012 ranged between 5% and 
10% of its potential revenue, which is low by international 
standards – below that typically observed in European and 
Latin American countries (Ueda & Thackray 2015:2). This 
implies that the country has a sound and well-functioning 
tax system.
It would be even more insightful to compare South Africa’s 
PIT gap with other developing countries’. Unfortunately, 
knowledge about tax gaps in developing countries is limited 
(aside from the Pakistan study which reported a compliance 
PIT gap of 41.1%; [see Ahmed & Rider 2013:339]).
Although the South African tax system has a high compliance 
rate, further measures are required to stimulate increased 
compliance of provisional taxpayers. These measures may 
include formalising the underground economy, further 
strengthening deterrent measures and building taxpayers’ 
trust in the authorities (i.e. improving citizens’ perception of 
the government).
It would even be more enlightening to estimate the tax gap 
following the Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
approach, which uses audited data (that correspond to the 
tax year) made available by the tax authority. However, due 
to confidentiality of taxpayers’ information, such data is 
not easily accessible for academic research, particularly in 
South Africa. Given the data constraints, the tax gap estimates 
from this study remain an approximation of the gap and 
should be treated as such.
Acknowledgements
We would like to convey our sincere gratitude to Prof. Mark 
Rider (Georgia State University) for his considerable input in 
designing the tax simulation model.
Competing interests
The authors have declared that no competing interest exist.
Author’s contributions
This article is part of a PhD thesis. C.D. (the student) is the 
principal author while A.J. and S.d.P. (the supervisors) are 
co-authors.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding 
agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Data availability statement
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data 
were created or analysed in this study.
Disclaimer
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 
position of any affiliated agency of the authors.
References
Ahmed, R.A. & Rider, M., 2013, ‘Using microdata to estimate Pakistan’s tax 
gap by type of tax’, Public Finance Review 41(3), 334–359. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/1091142113475697
Alm, J. & Martinez, J., 2003, Institutions, paradigms, and tax evasion in developing and 
transition countries, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham.
Bäckman, J.-E., 2014, The development of the tax gap in Sweden 2007–12, The 
Swedish Tax Agency, Solna.
Black, P.A., Calitz, E. & Steenekamp, T.J., 2015, Public economics, Oxford University 
Press, Cape Town.
DTC, 2014, Addressing base erosion and profit shifting in South Africa, viewed 27 June 
2016, from http://www.taxcom.org.za/docs/New_Folder/1 DTC BEPS Interim 
Report - The Introductory Report.pdf.
European Commission, 2016, The concept of tax gaps: Report on VAT gap estimations, 
FISCALIS Tax Gap Project Group (FPG/041), European Commission, Brussels. 
(FPG/041).
Fuest, C. & Riedel, N., 2009, Tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax expenditures in 
developing countries: A review of the existing literature, Oxford University 
Centre. Prepared for the UK Department for International Development (DFID), 
London.
Gcabo, R. & Robinson, Z., 2007, ‘Tax compliance and behavioural response in 
South Africa: An alternative investigation’, SAJEMS NS 10(3), 357–370. https://doi.
org/10.4102/sajems.v10i3.695
Gemmell, N. & Hasseldine, J., 2012, ‘The tax gap: A methodological review’, Working 
Papers in Finance 09/12, Victoria University of Wellington.
IMF, 2015, South Africa: Revenue aministration gap analysis program – The value 
added tax Gap, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Keen, M., 2013, ‘The anatomy of the VAT’, National Tax Journal, 66(2), 423–446. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2013.2.06
Marcus, M., 2007, ‘A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the South African tax 
system (1995–2005)’, PhD thesis, University of Cape Town.
National Treasury, 2019, 2019 Budget review, National Treasury, Pretoria.
National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2011, 2011 Tax 
statistics, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria.
National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2015, 2015 Tax 
statistics, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria.
National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2016, 2016 Tax 
statistics, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria.
National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2017, 2017 Tax 
statistics, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria.
National Treasury (NT) & South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2018, 2018 Tax 
statistics, National Treasury and SARS, Pretoria.
Paulus, A., 2015, ‘Income underreporting based on income-expenditure gaps: Survey 
vs tax records’, ISER Working Paper Series. No. 2015–15, Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, Essex.
Rubin, M., 2011, The practicality of the top-down approach to estimating the direct 
tax gap, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, London.
Rasool, F., 2011, SARS system boosts ‘Who am I online’, viewed 23 October 
2016, from http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view 
=article&id=42048. Income Tax
South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2006, Guide on income tax and the individual 
(2005/06), viewed 10 September 2016, from https://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/
Pages/default.aspx.
South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2010, Notes on South African Income Tax 2010, 
South African Revenue Authority, Pretoria.
South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2016a, Income Tax Guide on Income Tax and 
the Individual (2015/16), South African Revenue Authority, Pretoria.
Page 8 of 8 Original Research
http://www.sajems.org Open Access
South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2016b, ‘Implementation of the modernisation 
programme’, in J. Hattingh, J. Roeleveld & C. West (eds.), Income Tax in South 
Africa: The first 100 years 1914–2014, pp. 404–410, Juta and Company (Pty) 
Limited, Cape Town.
South African Revenue Service (SARS), 2018, Provisional tax, viewed 20 April 2019, 
from https://www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/PT/Pages/default.aspx.
Stats SA, 2008, Income & expenditure of households 2005/2006. Analysis of results: 
Report No. 01-00-01, Statistics South Africa, Pretoria.
Stats SA, 2012, Income and expenditure of households 2010/2011, Statistics 
South Africa, viewed 18 November 2016, from http://www.statssa.gov.za.
Toro, J., Ogata, K., Hutton, E. & Caner, S., 2013, United Kingdom: Assessment of 
HMRC’s tax gap. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. (13/314).
Ueda, J. & Thackray, M., 2015, Revenue administration gap analysis program – The 
value-added tax gap, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF, Washington, DC.
Whicker, H. & White, A., 2015, Measuring tax gaps 2015 edition: Tax gap estimates for 
2013–14, HM Revenue & Customs, London.
